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INCENTIVES FOR CONSERVATION 
EASEMENTS: THE CHARITABLE 
DEDUCTION OR A BETTER WAY 
DANIEL HALPERIN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Internal Revenue Code allows a charitable income-tax deduction for a 
“qualified conservation contribution,”
1 known, more colloquially, as a 
conservation easement. To be eligible for the deduction, the easement must be 
“granted in perpetuity” to a “qualified organization, exclusively for 
conservation purposes.”
2 The 1980 change in the tax law to codify this deduction 
is generally recognized as being the factor largely responsible for the 
tremendous growth in the donation of conservation easements.
3 The Land Trust 
Alliance, an umbrella organization for land trusts, (like other defenders of the 
tax deduction) has pointed to the millions of acres now protected by 
conservation easements as evidence of the tax-expenditure program’s enormous 
success.
4 What is striking, however, is that supporters make no mention of the 
program’s cost. 
This article presents a discussion of tax-policy concerns relating to the 
charitable deduction for conservation easement donations. The deduction is 
unique in a number of ways. First, since 1969, the Internal Revenue Code has 
generally denied the deduction for a gift of a partial property interest.
5 The 
conflict of interest between charity and other owners raises a concern that the 
charitable deduction would not reflect the ultimate charitable benefit. The 
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  1.  I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) (2006); id. § 170(h)(1). 
  2. Id. § 170(h)(1)(B)–(C). See id. § 170(h)(3) (defining “qualified organization”). 
  3. See, e.g., Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural Beauty: The Promise and 
Dilemma of Conservation Easements, 33 HARV.  ENVTL.  L.  REV. 119, 135 (2010); Nancy A. 
McLaughlin,  Increasing the Tax Incentives for Conservation Easement Donations—A Responsible 
Approach, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 22 (2004). 
  4.  Land Trust Alliance President Testifies at Finance Hearing on Land Conservation Tax Breaks, 
2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 110-49, June 9, 2005, at 2 (“Since Congress enabled tax deductions for those 
donations, land trusts have protected more than 9 million acres of important wildlife habitat, farms, 
ranches, and forests with this tool.”). The Land Trust Alliance describes itself as the strategist and 
representative of over 1700 land trusts nationwide. Leadership in Land Conservation, LAND TRUST 
ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/about (last visited Dec. 31, 2010). 
  5.  I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(A). HALPERIN  9/15/2011  
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deduction for conservation easements is the principal exception to this rule
6 
despite the significant potential for abuse and the distinct possibility that the 
public benefit may be less than anticipated. Moreover, the few other exceptions 
are either narrower or more carefully circumscribed. 
Second, since 2006, the limitation on the deduction for a qualified 
conservation contribution is, at least temporarily,
7 uniquely high. In contrast to 
the deduction for other appreciated property, which is limited to thirty percent 
of the so-called contribution base,
8 the deduction limit for a qualified 
conservation contribution is generally fifty percent of the contribution base.
9 In 
the case of certain contributions from persons earning more than fifty percent 
of their gross income from farming or ranching, the limit is increased to one 
hundred percent.
10 Further, instead of the normal carryover of five years for 
unused contributions, the carryover for these contributions is extended to 
fifteen years.
11 In addition, the taxable value of land for estate-tax purposes can 
be reduced by as much as $500,000 for up to forty percent of the value of land 
subject to a conservation easement, in addition to any value reduction from the 
effect of the easement itself.
12 These provisions are extraordinary. It is unlikely 
many would believe that this charitable purpose should be elevated above all 
others. 
Although I have previously written on the charitable deduction,
13 I am not 
an expert on conservation easements. I have been invited to participate in this 
symposium, and at earlier conferences at the Lincoln Institute
14 and the Harvard  
 
  6. See id. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) (providing exception for a “qualified conservation contribution”). 
  7.  The liberalization of the deductions limit expired at the end of 2009 pursuant to I.R.C. § 
170(b)(1)(E)(vi), but was extended through December 31, 2011 in the Tax Relief, Unemployment 
Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 723, 124 Stat. 3296, 
3316. 
  8.  I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C). 
  9. Id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(i). This provision was added as part of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-280, §1206(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1068. 
  10.  I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(E)(iv). 
  11. Id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(ii). 
  12. Id. § 2031(c). Senate Finance Committee Chair Max Baucus introduced legislation, H.R. 4853, 
111th Cong. §306 (2010), that would greatly expand this provision to allow estate reduction by as much 
as fifty percent of the land value up to $5,000,000. Baucus Amendment Would Extend Tax Cut, 2010 
TAX NOTES TODAY 233-82, Dec. 6, 2010, at 37. This provision, however, was not included in the final 
version of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296. 
  13. See Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization of 
Built-In Gains, 56 TAX L. REV. 1 (2002). 
  14.  Conservation Easements Policy Seminar, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Lincoln House, 
Cambridge, Mass. (Feb. 18, 2005). For a brief overview of this conference, see 
https://www.lincolninst.edu/education/education-coursedetail.asp?id=254 (last visited Mar. 8, 2011). HALPERIN  9/15/2011  
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Law School,
15 because reporters at the Philadelphia Inquirer
16 discovered 
testimony I had delivered on behalf of the Treasury back in 1979 and 1980.
17 My 
testimony had raised serious concerns about allowing the charitable deduction 
for conservation easement contributions. 
The Treasury was troubled by the possibility of overvaluation of 
conservation easements and the difficulty of accurately valuing such partial 
interests in land. The Treasury believed that the proposed legislation failed to 
provide a sufficiently precise definition of conservation purposes and thus did 
not insure that deductible contributions would be confined to those providing 
some benefit to the general public. The Treasury was also concerned because 
the proposed legislation did not guarantee that the perpetual easements would 
be enforced over the long term. The professional tax staffs of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation and the Senate Finance Committee expressed similar 
reservations in 2005,
18 indicating that the problems the Treasury had identified 
in 1979 and 1980 remain. To summarize: 
1.  Unlike gifts of cash or marketable securities, the amount of the deduction for a 
conservation easement donation depends upon an appraisal. The uniqueness of each 
encumbered property, the variability in easement restrictions, and the paucity of 
cash easement sales make it highly unlikely that the value of a conservation 
easement can be derived from sales of comparable easements.
19 
2.  The charitable deduction should be measured by either the loss in value to the donor 
or the benefit to charity, whichever is less. The diminution in the donor’s assets 
would often suffice. The assumption that the detriment to the donor is equivalent to 
the value to charity—which would seem to follow in the case of a cash gift—is not 
necessarily true, however, in the case of a conservation easement donation. This 
would seem particularly true because the donee is not free to transfer or terminate 
the easement, especially if there is no independent certification of the public benefit. 
3.  When a charity holds only a partial interest in property, there is a significant risk that 
the property will be used in a way that is harmful to the charitable interest. This is of 
particular concern in the conservation easement context because the scope of the 
 
  15.  The 8th Annual Conference on Litigating Takings and Other Constitutional Challenges to 
Land Use and Environmental Regulations, Georgetown University Law Center CLE/Environmental 
Law and Policy Institute, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. (Oct. 27, 2005). For a brief overview 
of this conference, see http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/about_GELPI/Conf05.pdf. 
  16.  Craig R. McCoy & Linda K. Harris, Saving Treasures that Benefit Few; As Federal Law Helps 
Protect Private Property, the Public Often Gets Little, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 24, 2002, at A1, available 
at http://articles.philly.com/2002-02-24/news/25333700_1_federal-tax-tax-deduction-tax-revenue. 
  17.  Miscellaneous Tax Bills: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. 
Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Cong. 11 (1979) (statement of Daniel Halperin, Deputy Assistant 
Sec’y, Treasury Dep’t) (in reference to H.R. 4611); Minor Tax Bills: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Cong. 165 (1980) (statement of 
Daniel Halperin, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Treasury Dep’t) (in reference to H.R. 7318). 
 18.  STAFF OF THE JOINT  COMM. ON TAXATION,  110TH  CONG.,  OPTIONS TO IMPROVE  TAX 
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM  TAX  EXPENDITURES, JCS-2-05, at 277–87 (2005), available at 
http://www.jct.gov/s-2-05.pdf; Finance Committee Issues Report on the Nature Conservancy, 2005 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 109-11, June 8, 2005. 
  19. See,  e.g., Trout Ranch v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-283 (2010) (rejecting taxpayer’s argument 
that conservation easement at issue should be valued for purposes of a deduction based on the sale 
prices of other conservation easements because such easements were not comparable). HALPERIN  9/15/2011  
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easement restrictions will often not be easily determinable and because the holder 
may have neither the necessary resources for nor the interest in enforcement. 
Therefore, the revenue loss from the charitable deductions for easement 
donations might well be far more than the public benefit provided. Particularly 
at a time of severe revenue constraints, a huge disparity between the tax 
benefits (primarily for the wealthiest) and the public benefit is unacceptable. 
We need a new approach: one that would require a governmental entity or a 
land trust meeting certain minimum standards to certify the public benefit of 
the transfer. Given the potential for abuse of the tax deduction, preferably 
Congress should substitute direct government grants to facilitate the acquisition 
of conservation easements.
20 If this approach is not politically viable, it would be 
wise to place a dollar limit on the amount of the annual revenue loss by 
replacing the deduction with a limited amount of tax credits, to be allocated 
among eligible beneficiaries by an expert government agency. At the very least, 
such an agency or a beneficiary meeting specified standards should be required 
to certify the public charitable benefit. 
Although it may appear quite radical, my proposal is actually consistent with 
the direction of the tax law. First, this proposal merely recognizes the 
conservation easement gift’s unique status as an unlimited exception to the 
restrictions on gifts of partial interests, despite circumstances where the abuses 
inherent in such gifts are particularly likely to be prevalent. Moreover, the 
proposal is consistent with steps that have been taken to restrict deductions for 
partial-interest gifts in other contexts and to limit overvaluation of charitable 
contributions. Thus, a general modification of the charitable deduction is not a 
prerequisite to a new approach to conservation easements. 
Second, although once quite rare, dollar limits on the annual cost of tax 
expenditures and involvement of other agencies are becoming increasingly 
common. In these circumstances, reliance is appropriately placed on an expert 
agency to allocate a limited amount of government aid to the acquisition of 
conservation easements. In short, given the likely disparity between the revenue 
loss from the charitable deduction for conservation easement donations and the 
benefit to the public from the easements, change is appropriate. 
II 
PARTIAL INTERESTS IN PROPERTY 
A.  In General—1969 Tax Reform Act 
The risk that the donor benefit from a charitable deduction will exceed the 
public benefit from the donation is greatly increased when the charity receives 
 
  20. See Dominic P. Parker, Conservation Easements: A Closer Look at Federal Tax Policy, PERC 
POLICY SERIES, Oct. 2005, at 20–22, http://www.perc.org/pdf/ps34.pdf (discussing potential benefits of 
replacing federal tax-code funding with “federal competitive grants requiring trusts to raise matching 
funds from private sources and local governments”). HALPERIN  9/15/2011  
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only a partial property interest. A partial interest is unique in that the future 
behavior of the donor or a subsequent transferee determines the contributed 
property’s charitable value. For example, if I were to give my daughter an 
income interest in a trust fund, with a remainder interest to Harvard, I could 
have the funds invested in an oil well, which will be dry in ten or fifteen years. 
In that case, my daughter’s income would be substantial, but Harvard would 
receive nothing. Despite the appearance of a contribution and the receipt of a 
deduction, I would have given nothing of value to charity for the public benefit. 
This ability to structure partial-interest donations to favor private interests over 
the charitable beneficiary led Congress to amend the Internal Revenue Code to 
prohibit charitable deductions for most partial-interest gifts.
21 
That 1969 reform focused on gifts in trust. Reflecting the heightened 
concern that prior rules allowed a “taxpayer to receive a charitable contribution 
deduction for a gift to charity of a remainder interest in trust which was 
substantially in excess of the amount that the charity might eventually 
receive,”
22 Congress generally limited the deduction to a charitable-remainder 
annuity trust or a charitable-remainder unitrust.
23 The Joint Committee on 
Taxation noted that the limitations “remove the flexibility of the prior 
provisions whereby it was possible to favor the income beneficiary over the 
remainder beneficiary by means of manipulating the trust’s investments.”
24 To 
prevent similar abuse, Congress disallowed a deduction for a partial interest not 
in trust except in very limited circumstances—an undivided interest in property 
and a remainder interest in a personal residence or farm.
25 
B.  Remainder Interest in a Residence 
The Senate Finance Committee proposed a deduction for gifts of all 
remainder interests in real property, citing as an example a gift of a personal 
residence.
26 The 1969 Conference Committee subsequently narrowed the Senate 
Finance Committee’s proposed rule to allow deductibility only for a remainder 
interest in a personal residence or farm.
27 
Charitable gifts of remainder interests in a personal residence were probably 
common types of transfers that, according to the Joint Committee, “Congress 
did not believe  .  .  . presented the kind of abuse that it was appropriate to 
 
  21.  Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a)(1), 83 Stat. 487, 556–57 (1969). 
 22.  STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969 83 (Comm. Print 1970). 
  23.  I.R.C. § 170(f)(2)(A) (2006). 
 24.  STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 84. 
  25.  I.R.C. § 170(f)(3). 
 26.  S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 89 (1969). 
 27.  H.R. REP. NO. 91-782, at 294 (1969) (Conf. Rep.). The special treatment of “farmers” is not 
unusual and will not be examined here. HALPERIN  9/15/2011  
34 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol.  74:29 
curtail.”
28 Perhaps Congress believed it was unlikely the remainder beneficiaries 
would be unduly disadvantaged because there was a negligible risk that a donor 
who continued to live in a residence would allow it to deteriorate. Still, 
Congress imposed strict standards to forestall overvaluation of remainder-
interest gifts.
29 This narrow, carefully circumscribed exception to the denial of a 
deduction for charitable partial-interest gifts is relevant in examining the need 
for further restrictions on deductions for conservation easement transfers. 
C. Undivided  Interests 
In 1969, Congress also allowed a deduction for contributions of an 
undivided interest in property, perhaps on the assumption that, because the 
charity’s interest was the same as that of other undivided-interest holders, the 
value to the charity must be the applicable percentage of the entire value. In 
2006, however, Congress realized that the charity would not necessarily receive 
what it was entitled to. For example, museums often did not exercise their right 
to possess a work of art for the applicable portion of the year, permitting the 
donor to retain full possession.
30 Therefore, in 2006, Congress substantially 
restricted the deduction for an undivided-interest gift, denying the deduction if 
the charity did not have substantial physical possession of the property or would 
not obtain full ownership within ten years of the initial gift. Further, the fair 
market value at the time of the original transfer determines the value of any 
subsequent donation unless the value has declined.
31 These limitations are 
relevant to the consideration of conservation easements, which seem far more 
likely to be abused. With an undivided interest in property such as a work of 
art, the only question is whether, in deference to the donor, the charity will fail 
to enforce its rights. The charity’s rights are clear, and enforcement is 
straightforward. With conservation easements, on the other hand, the scope of 
the restrictions will often be uncertain, and enforcement is decidedly more 
problematic. 
D. Conservation  Easements 
The Internal Revenue Code made no mention of conservation easements in 
1969. Although land trusts have existed since the late nineteenth century,
32 
easements for conservation purposes were rarely seen until the 1930s; and, prior 
 
 28.  STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 84. 
  29. Id.; see I.R.C. § 170(f)(4) (providing for valuation of remainder interest in real property). 
  30. See James B. Lyon, Reflections on Deductibility of Contributions of Items of Tangible Personal 
Property to Museums, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 32-45, Feb. 15, 2007, at 7. 
  31.  I.R.C. § 170(o). 
  32.  For a brief history of land trusts in the United States, beginning with the first land trust, the 
Trustees of Public Reservations (formed in Massachusetts  in 1891), see RICHARD  BREWER, 
CONSERVANCY:  THE  LAND  TRUST  MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 13–40 (2003). According to Brewer, 
although the first national land trust, The Nature Conservancy, was founded in 1946, the land trust 
movement did not begin until 1981. HALPERIN  9/15/2011  
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to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, little was written about them. Thus, it was 
perhaps unimportant to the nascent conservation movement that the 1969 
reforms appeared to deny a deduction for conservation easements. 
Nevertheless, Congress had some last-minute regrets. The 1969 Conference 
report described an uncodified exception for certain easements, which were to 
be considered the gift of an undivided interest in property.
33 This seems strange 
because the rationale for the undivided-interest exception—namely that the 
charity’s interest was identical to that of the other partial owners—was clearly 
inapplicable. 
This purported exception may have reflected Congress’s intent to preserve 
the charitable deduction the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had recognized for 
conservation easements five years earlier.
34 In a 1964 Revenue Ruling, the IRS 
ruled that a taxpayer who placed a restrictive easement on property adjacent to 
a federal highway, limiting the use and development of the land to preserve a 
scenic view, was entitled to a charitable income-tax deduction equal to the 
easement’s fair market value.
35 In 1965, the IRS issued a news release indicating 
that charitable deductions could be claimed for gifts of “scenic easements” to 
qualified recipients.
36 Apparently in reliance on the conference report, the IRS 
continued to recognize these exceptions despite the passage of the 1969 Act.
37 
In the mid-1970s, interest in conservation easements increased. By the 
1980s, the use of conservation easements was becoming widespread.
38 In these 
circumstances, it would have seemed unwise to continue to rely on an 
unsupported statement in the legislative history to justify a deduction. 
Presumably in response, Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
39 
temporarily codifying the deductibility of conservation easement donations. No 
reason was given for the addition of the easement provisions to the 1976 Act, 
and the Act’s legislative history includes no testimony or debate by interested 
parties or legislators concerning conservation easement provisions.
40 In 1980, 
Congress made the conservation easement provisions permanent.
41 
In sum, Congress has provided a broad, unfettered exception to the rule 
disallowing deductions for partial-interest gifts for conservation easement 
donations; but, as the Treasury testimony noted, it has failed to pay sufficient 
attention to whether there is protection from the serious problems that led to 
 
 33.  H.R. REP. NO. 91-782, at 292 (1969) (“The conferences on the part of both Houses intend that 
a gift of an open space easement in gross is to be considered a gift of an undivided interest in property 
where the easement is in perpetuity.”). 
  34. See,  e.g., Rev. Rul. 64-205, 1964-2 C.B. 62.  
  35. Id. 
  36.  I.R.S. News Release IR-65-784 (Nov. 15, 1965). 
  37. See S. REP. NO. 96-1007, at 8–9 (1980). 
 38.  BREWER, supra note 32, at 148. 
  39.  Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2124(e), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). 
  40.  Stephen J. Small, An Obscure Tax Provision, in P ROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION 
EASEMENTS PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 55, 56–57 (Julie Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires 
eds., 2000). 
  41.  Pub. L. No. 96-541, § 6, 94 Stat. 3204 (1980). HALPERIN  9/15/2011  
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these deductions’ prohibition. This failure is highlighted by the recent severe 
restrictions on gifts of undivided interests. There are substantial questions 
whether the charitable deduction for conservation easements reflects the 
charity’s benefit from the gift,
42 in part because the definition of public benefit is 
imprecise and because there rarely is direct evidence of the value to the public. 
Further, it is not clear that the intended conservation benefit, such as it is, will 
be secured. Restrictions on the use of the property in an easement can be 
murky and difficult to interpret. Even if they are not, the current regulations 
provide inadequate assurance that holders will enforce the perpetual 
conservation easements according to their terms. 
E. Enforcement 
“The real work with conservation easements begins after the signature ink is 
dry. Even the best written easements are only as good as the holder’s resolve 
and capacity over the long term to monitor, enforce, and defend them.”
43 
Unfortunately, the current Treasury regulations do not provide adequate 
assurance that easements will be enforced. The Treasury regulations do require 
the organization receiving a conservation easement to be a publicly supported 
charity that has “a commitment to protect the conservation purposes of the 
donation, and . . . the resources to enforce the restrictions.”
44 But this can be a 
mirage. The commitment can be shown merely by including the appropriate 
language in the organization’s articles of incorporation, and the organization 
“need not set aside funds to enforce the restrictions.”
45 The regulations also fail 
to specify what an organization must do following the gift to demonstrate that it 
has the requisite commitment and resources. 
Recognizing this problem, in 2005, the Senate Finance Committee staff 
recommended that the IRS issue guidance establishing the conditions necessary 
for compliance with the monitoring obligation, which might include a 
stewardship fund, periodic monitoring reports, and a centralized directory of 
easements.
46 As suggested, the annual information return filed with the IRS now 
requires the organization to state whether it has a written policy regarding the 
periodic monitoring, inspection, handling of violations, and enforcement of 
easements, and asks for data as to the time and money devoted to this purpose.
47 
But the IRS has not indicated what enforcement activity is required.
48 
 
  42. See  infra  Part III. 
 43.  JEFF PIDOT, REINVENTING CONSERVATION EASEMENTS, A CRITICAL EXAMINATION AND 
IDEAS FOR REFORM 18 (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy 2005).  
  44.  Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (as amended in 2009). 
  45. Id. 
 46.  STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 109TH CONG., 1 REP. OF STAFF INVESTIGATION OF THE 
NATURE CONSERVANCY, at Executive Summary 11 (Comm. Print 2005). 
  47.  Schedule D to Form 990, the Annual Return of an Organization Exempt From Income Tax. 
Schedule D is required for all easement holders, which must disclose this status in Question 7 of Form 
990, Part IV. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 109TH CONG., 1 REP. OF STAFF INVESTIGATION OF 
THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, at Executive Summary 11 (recommending that the IRS modify Form HALPERIN  9/15/2011  
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Of course, the failure to enforce the easement would in most cases have no 
impact on the donor’s deduction. Thus, to strengthen the obligation to enforce, 
the Senate Finance Committee staff also recommended in 2005 that “the IRS 
consider revoking the tax exempt status of a conservation organization that 
regularly and continuously fails to monitor and enforce conservation 
easements.”
49 Most significantly, the staff recommended that “the law should 
permit the IRS to impose excise taxes on officers and directors for failure to 
adopt and enforce policies to assure the organization satisfies its monitoring and 
enforcement obligations.”
50 This is a sensible idea that would put real teeth in 
the enforcement obligation. It deserves to be considered by Congress. 
In any event, it is not enough that the holder care about protecting the 
easement; it must have the resources to do so. “Many land trusts are newly 
created, underfunded, and in a weak position to commit to this kind of 
permanent stewardship.”
51 Therefore, the donee should be required to certify 
that it has selected the easement consistent with its mission and that it has both 
the resources to manage and enforce the restriction and a commitment to do so. 
Further, as the Senate staff suggested, funds should be set aside for monitoring, 
defending, and enforcing the easement. The Land Trust Alliance has taken 
substantial steps to achieve this goal as part of its accreditation process.
52 
Ideally, the Internal Revenue Code should require that tax-deductible 
easements be held solely by organizations that meet rigorous uniform 
standards.
53 Moreover, because it is obviously easier to set aside adequate funds 
if one expects a problem with a relatively small percentage of a large number of 
easements, eligibility should be restricted to organizations that hold a 
substantial number of easement grants and have sufficient staff to monitor and 
enforce compliance. To assure that funds will be available for enforcement, the 
donor should be required either to contribute such funds or to demonstrate that 
the organization has adequate resources. These steps would increase the 
 
990 “to require conservation organizations to provide information regarding its ongoing monitoring 
and enforcement policies and practices”). 
  48.  But see generally I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201048045 (Dec. 3, 2010) (denying tax-exempt status for 
failure to demonstrate ability to enforce easement); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201109030 (Mar. 4, 2011) 
(denying exempt status for accepting nonqualifying property and for failure to monitor and enforce 
easements); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201110020 (Mar. 11, 2011) (denying exempt status inter alia for failure 
to ensure that accepted easements serve a conservation purpose or to demonstrate its commitment to 
protect the easements it accepts). 
  49.  STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 109TH CONG., 1 REP. OF STAFF INVESTIGATION OF THE 
NATURE CONSERVANCY, at Executive Summary 10. 
  50. Id. 
 51.  PIDOT, supra note 43. 
  52. See Land Trust Standards and Practices, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 8–9, 12 (2004) (Standard 8: 
Evaluating and Selecting Conservation Projects; and Standard 11: Conservation and Easement 
Stewardship), http://www.landtrustalliance.org/training/sp/lt-standards-practices07.pdf. These standards 
must be adopted as part of the Alliance’s accreditation process. See also Accreditation Requirements, 
LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustaccreditation.org/getting-accredited/are-you-ready (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2011). 
 53.  PIDOT, supra note 43, at 21. HALPERIN  9/15/2011  
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likelihood that the public benefit from an easement donation will be in accord 
with the terms of the gift. 
III 
DETERMINING THE BENEFIT TO CHARITY 
A.  Valuation In General 
Even if the gift is enforced according to its terms, however, it is not 
necessarily the case that the public benefit flowing from an easement donation 
will match the tax revenue lost from the deduction. If the public benefit is not 
commensurate with the revenue loss, one of the traditional rationales for 
allowing tax deductions for charitable donations—namely that charitable 
activities serve as a substitute for government services—will not be satisfied.
54 
When a contributor donates cash, the amount contributed (which ordinarily 
determines the tax deduction) would, apart from the costs of fundraising,
55 be 
identical to the benefit to charity. Gifts of property raise greater concern for 
two reasons. First, unlike cash, the value of property may be misstated. It can be 
difficult to determine the value of a donated item,
56 and there is a strong 
incentive for a donor to overstate the value of her donation in order to claim a 
larger deduction and thus decrease her taxable income. Second, the value of the 
property in the charity’s hands may be less than its fair market value. Both 
concerns arise in the context of conservation easement donations, and it is 
instructive that Congress has attempted to address these concerns with respect 
to other forms of charitable contributions. 
For example, in the case of tangible personal property, which can be difficult 
to value, section 170(e) of the Internal Revenue Code mitigates the valuation 
 
 54.  Rob  Atkinson,  Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 606 n.292 (1990); 
Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 
585, 590 (1998) (“Under the subsidy theory, tax exemption functions as an inducement to charities to 
undertake specific activities or to engage in behavior a certain way. For example, under the classic 
conception of this ‘quid-pro-quo’ approach, the state bestows tax exemption in recognition of charities’ 
lessening the burdens of government.”); id. at 590 n.23 (discussing legislative history supporting this 
rationale); see C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple and Effective Giving: 
Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable Contributions and Charitable Organizations, 12 AM. J. TAX 
POL’Y 399, 404 (1995) (stating that among other justifications for the charitable deduction “is the belief 
that the philanthropic sector represents a third sector that sometimes can meet needs better or more 
efficiently than the government or the individual acting on his or her own behalf”). 
  55.  Excessive fundraising costs call into question the efficiency of charitable organizations. The 
discussion in the text might suggest we should seek a mechanism to exclude from donors’ tax 
deductions the portion of each donation attributable to fundraising costs. This is an issue affecting all 
charitable organizations and will not be pursued here. 
  56.  William A. Drennan, Charitable Donations of Intellectual Property: The Case for Retaining the 
Fair Market Value Tax Deduction, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1045, 1084 n.173 (2004); see Erin Thompson, 
The Relationship Between Tax Deductions and the Market for Unprovenanced Antiquities, 33 COLUM. 
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problem by limiting the charitable deduction to basis, usually cost, unless the 
receiving charity uses the property in a manner consistent with its exempt 
charitable purpose.
57 When it applies, this provision eliminates the valuation 
issue. It also deters such gifts, thereby reducing the misalignment between the 
deduction and the value to charity that occurs when a deduction fails to account 
for the costs the charity incurs in disposing of the property. But this provision 
does not apply to gifts of real property like conservation easements and, in any 
event, would not apply when the receiving charity uses the property in a 
manner consistent with its exempt charitable purpose. 
Moreover, limiting the deduction to cost, though important in preventing 
overvaluation, would not prevent the deduction from exceeding the property 
value if value is below the original cost. The latter would generally be true when 
the property, such as a household or clothing item, was originally purchased for 
personal use. In such cases, there are additional restrictions that focus on the 
value to the charity. To ensure there is some value to the charity from the 
donation of a household or clothing item, a taxpayer may not claim a deduction 
for such item that is not in “good used condition or better,” unless the item is 
worth more than $500 and the taxpayer provides a qualified appraisal to that 
effect.
58 
Among donations of tangible personal property, used automobile 
contributions, in particular, have raised questions about the proportionality of 
charitable tax deductions. The IRS previously allowed donors to deduct the so-
called blue-book value of a car even though donors would not likely be able to 
sell the car for that amount unless they advertised heavily and sold the car in a 
private transaction.
59 Concerns about taxpayers’ inflating the value of donated 
used cars
60 led Congress to amend the Internal Revenue Code in 2004 to 
generally limit deductions of used-car donations above $500 to the gross 
proceeds of the charity’s subsequent sale.
61 Charities, however, often partner 
with for-profit entities that act as the charity’s agent. The agent will bear the 
cost of taking possession and selling the vehicle and, perhaps, for advertising 
the program. These costs plus the agent’s fee are subtracted from the amount 
paid to the charity, which suggests the charity could receive considerably less 
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  60. See Wendy C. Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy, 87 OR. L. REV. 1133, 1145 (2008) (“The 
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than the selling price.
62 Thus, although the 2004 legislation ameliorates some 
valuation problems by linking deductions to the sale price of donated 
automobiles,
63 it does not entirely ensure that each deduction’s revenue cost 
matches the benefit to the recipient charity. 
Despite its limitations, the decision to focus on the charitable value in the 
case of used automobile donations (as opposed to the asserted “loss” to the 
donor based upon the price that some hypothetical buyer might be willing to 
pay for the car) is important. In 2004, Congress similarly based the tax 
deduction for gifts of copyrights, patents, and other intellectual property largely 
on the amount of the income actually received by the donee.
64 These changes 
illustrate the inappropriateness of focusing primarily on the decline in the value 
of the donor’s property or assets. The cost to the government, namely the 
revenue loss from the charitable deduction, should never exceed the actual 
benefit to charity. 
B.  Valuing Easement Donations 
Congress’s concern with overvaluation of charitable contributions and its 
focus on the value to the recipient show that modification of the rules 
applicable to conservation easement donations is appropriate. The rules for 
conservation easement gifts provide inadequate assurance that the amount of 
the charitable deduction will be properly determined. Easements are often hard 
to appraise and easy to overvalue. For a conservation easement, for which 
comparable sales (purchases of similar easements on closely similar properties) 
would be rare, the focus is on the decline in the property value for the donor 
due to the imposition of the restriction. But not only is this decline difficult to 
measure, the approach itself is also faulty. As a consequence, the donor is often 
able to take a higher federal tax deduction than is justifiable. 
The IRS regulations provide that, in the absence of comparable sales, a 
donor must generally look to the difference between the value of the property 
before the restriction and the value of the property subject to the easement.
65 
This is extremely difficult to determine because it is heavily fact specific. For 
example, it would be necessary to determine what the zoning regulations are, 
whether they are likely to change, and what sort of development was 
commercially feasible prior to the restrictions, as well as other issues. That there 
is no standard form of easement exacerbates these difficulties, as does the IRS’s 
 
  62. See  generally  GAO Report, supra note 60; Rev. Rul. 2002-67, 2002-2 C.B. 873; I.R.S. Pub. 
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lack of the resources required to wade through long documents—drafted by 
hundreds of different attorneys—in order to determine exactly what restrictions 
are in place and whether the easements satisfy the various requirements under 
section 170(h) and the Treasury Regulations. The use of standardized language 
as a condition for a tax deduction has thus been recommended.
66 This should be 
seriously considered. 
Another problem with conservation easement donations is that the donor 
may actually benefit from use restrictions. The regulations recognize that an 
easement restricting neighboring development could increase the value of 
nearby properties. Thus, the donor must take into account the effect the 
easement may have on the value of other property owned by the donor or a 
related party and reduce the charitable deduction accordingly.
67 Because 
reciprocal easements by owners of adjoining property could increase the value 
of the whole area, however, the donor should also be required to account for 
any increase in value of other property, owned by the donor or a related party, 
due to corresponding restrictions placed by owners of nearby properties. This 
may prove impossible, making the donor’s loss even more difficult to quantify. 
More importantly, this is the wrong question. As the restrictions on gifts of 
intellectual property and used automobiles demonstrate, the diminution in 
value to the donor is an inappropriate starting point in measuring the benefit to 
the public. The focus should be on actual benefit to the public, and the taxpayer 
should be required to present evidence as to this amount. Otherwise, there is no 
assurance that the charitable benefit will match the revenue loss. 
The decline in value to the holder, however, should be the maximum 
deduction. When it is clear that there will be no impact on the donor’s 
enjoyment of the property in the foreseeable future, a deduction is 
inappropriate. Therefore, it is disturbing that, in a number of recent cases, the 
Tax Court has rejected the IRS’s zero or negligible easement valuation, which 
the IRS apparently based on the idea that the value to the donor had not 
changed. The court reasoned that a prospective purchaser would surely take the 
restrictions into account. In at least one case, the court specifically noted that 
the government expert had confused “the post-easement value of the land to 
[the donor] with the fair market value of the land to a willing buyer and 
seller.”
68 To the contrary, the post-gift value to the donor is highly relevant. If 
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the donor has given nothing away, the tax deduction is merely a windfall, not an 
incentive to contribute. The post-gift value to the donor is especially relevant in 
the absence of any evidence of the value that would be attributed to the 
easement by a responsible land trust. 
C.  Establishing Public Benefit 
Although the current Internal Revenue Code does require a conservation 
purpose,
69 the definition is too open ended. The standard for determining public 
benefit is vague, especially when there is no public access and the property has 
no value as a habitat for plants and animals. The preservation of open space for 
scenic enjoyment is particularly problematic. The regulations state that “to 
satisfy the requirement of scenic enjoyment by the general public, visual (rather 
than physical access) to or across the property by the general public is 
sufficient,”
70 which indicates that the donor might not have given up anything of 
value. Furthermore, that “the entire property need not be visible to the public”
71 
leaves open the question of how much the public must be able to see. The 
regulations provide that “the public benefit from the donation may be 
insufficient to qualify for a deduction if only a small portion of the property is 
visible to the public.”
72 This language suggests to a tax lawyer that it may be 
enough to claim a deduction if the public can see only a small portion and that it 
is certainly sufficient if the public can see a portion that is only slightly bigger 
than “small.” 
Discussing the vagueness of what is meant by scenic enjoyment illustrates 
the general problem with the public-benefit standard. In response, in 2005, the 
staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (which serves both the House Ways 
and Means Committee and the Senate Committee on Finance) recommended 
that, to qualify for a deduction, a contribution must generally protect or 
preserve property pursuant to a clearly defined governmental conservation 
policy, which is now required only in the case of some donations in order to 
protect open space.
73 A clearly defined governmental conservation policy is the 
minimum requirement necessary to assure some public benefit. Under the 
current regulations, however, the government need not identify particular 
parcels, and the governmental policy could be quite vague.
74 
Ideally, the donee should be required to certify publicly that it views the 
public benefit to be at the level of the claimed deduction, which should also be 
publicly disclosed. Charitable organizations generally do not wish to take 
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responsibility for abusive deductions, viewing this as a matter to be worked out 
between the donor and the IRS. Nevertheless, more involvement by the charity 
is essential if we are to continue a special exemption from the rule prohibiting a 
deduction for a partial interest in property without other protection against the 
potential abuse that led to that prohibition. The Land Trust Alliance’s 
Standards and Practices requires the recipient to evaluate the public benefit and 
to review each transaction for consistency with tax requirements. Yet, although 
the trust must agree that it “will not knowingly participate in projects where it 
has significant concerns about the tax deduction,” the standards indicate that 
the donor is responsible for determining the value of the donation.
75 The 
recipient should instead be required to share the responsibility for valuation. 
D.  Viability of Current Approach 
The prior discussion demonstrates that the concerns the Treasury expressed 
more than thirty years ago—namely, potential lack of enforcement, inadequacy 
of public benefit, and overvaluation of contributions—remain. Donors may be 
giving up very little, particularly because the burden on a donor depends upon 
the holder’s monitoring and enforcing the use restrictions over the long term. In 
addition, an easement’s benefit to the public may be much less than the 
purported loss to the donor. 
Publicity generated by articles in the Washington Post
76 led to heightened 
IRS enforcement efforts,
77 including enhanced information-reporting 
requirements,
78 and fairly drastic proposals for legislative change from the 
congressional staff. Even the land-trust community acknowledged that some 
action was needed. 
  It is not surprising that the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation 
recommended that deductions be disallowed entirely for easements connected 
to the taxpayer’s residence and limited to thirty-three percent of their value in 
all other circumstances.
79 The staff reasoned that, in the case of residences, the 
deduction often resulted in a windfall because the owners frequently 
anticipated no restriction on planned use.
80 Thus, in light of what the staff 
viewed as insurmountable valuation difficulties, it was best to eliminate the 
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deduction entirely. In other cases, they viewed the problem as less severe, but 
still found valuation concerns significant enough to warrant limiting the 
deduction to thirty-three percent of the appraised amount. The staff clearly 
came to the same conclusion that Congress reached in 1969 with respect to gifts 
of partial interests—under present circumstances, the risk of tax abuse 
outweighs the potential benefits. Therefore, it would be best to substantially 
curtail the program. 
Predictably, Congress did not do as the staff suggested. The land-trust 
community strongly opposed the proposals, which would have drastically 
reduced the availability of a tax deduction. Although the community agreed 
that it would be sensible to prohibit deductions in some extreme cases, such as 
easements on golf courses or backyards, their focus was on increased IRS 
enforcement and securing more-accurate valuations—for example, by 
establishing standards for appraisers and increasing the penalty for abuse.
81 
The Pension Protection Act of 2006
82 attempted to make appraisals more 
accurate by increasing the penalty for valuation misstatements and imposing 
additional penalties on appraisers,
83 who must also meet certain standards to be 
“qualified” as appraisers.
84 Yet, despite suggestions from the congressional staff 
that the deduction be restricted, the Act went in the other direction, 
temporarily increasing the limit on conservation easement contributions from 
thirty percent to fifty percent and allowing an unlimited deduction for 
contributions by “qualified” farmers and ranchers.
85 
In my view, the restrictions adopted in 2006 are insufficient and do not come 
close to dealing with the problem. More disclosure of conservation easements 
on the annual return, which the IRS is requiring, will help but will not suffice. 
Although the IRS has significantly increased its attention to this area, it can 
obviously audit only a small sample of all transactions. Even putting aside 
deliberate abuse, the appraisal process is so indeterminate that getting the 
valuation right is extraordinarily difficult. 
In fact, more enforcement is the usual taxpayer response to the problem of 
identifying abuse. But, of course, the IRS does not get an increased budget for 
the task, and, in fact, no one wants an army of auditors. Not surprisingly, 
stepped-up enforcement efforts have led to criticism from tax lawyers.
86 
Moreover, more enforcement here means less enforcement elsewhere. 
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Parts II and III of this paper include proposals that would help to align the 
charitable deduction with the public benefit. Nevertheless, a new approach is 
preferable. 
IV 
A NEW APPROACH—DIRECT EXPENDITURES 
The current scheme for encouraging landowners to donate conservation 
easements is implemented through the income-tax system. The same 
conservation goals could also be addressed, however, through a direct 
government-spending program. A third option is to design a program in which a 
substantive agency, such as the Bureau of Land Management, helps to 
administer the tax incentives, with an annual dollar cap. A fourth option is to 
place a dollar limit on the annual expenditures for conservation easements, 
even if the IRS continues to administer the program. At the very least, an 
expert agency should be required to attest to the easement’s public value. These 
different approaches offer various benefits and drawbacks. 
A.  The Superiority of Direct Expenditures 
David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim have proposed a framework for deciding 
whether a tax-expenditure program or a direct-spending program would be 
more appropriate for a given policy goal.
87 They argue that the key is to 
determine how accurately a particular agency can implement a policy goal for a 
given cost.
88 Applying this framework in the context of conservation easements, 
we would compare the efficiency of a tax-expenditure program with that of a 
direct-spending program. The question then becomes: what value of land could 
be conserved for a given amount of either tax revenue forgone or government 
funds expended? 
Promoting conservation easement donation through a tax-expenditure 
program has certain benefits. First, it takes advantage of the tax system’s 
existing infrastructure. Individuals who donate conservation easements are 
already filing a tax return, and tax benefits can be distributed to the donor with 
minimal additional costs. The donor bears the cost of appraising the value of 
the easement, thus limiting the administrative burden on the IRS, at least 
initially.
89 The program is open ended, eliminating the need to prioritize or 
compare the merit of individual donations. In comparison to a direct-spending 
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program, which would need to evaluate and rank applications in order to 
allocate limited funds, it seems likely that integrating the program with the tax 
system would minimize administrative costs. 
Of course, this comes at the cost of greater accuracy. An open-ended tax-
benefit program is likely to have broad, rather than targeted, eligibility 
requirements. Further, because the IRS lacks the institutionalized knowledge of 
a more specialized agency, such as the Bureau of Land Management, it will be 
less capable of enforcing even these broader parameters consistently and 
coherently. Consequently, a tax expenditure will distribute more dollars than is 
likely to be appropriated, in exchange for less benefit. 
Implementing a program through the tax system would provide a particular 
benefit when doing so will take advantage of already existing definitions, 
measurements, and infrastructure.
90 The IRS’s primary institutional advantage is 
income measurement, which makes it a good fit for programs that have income-
based eligibility requirements.
91 The primary measurements at issue in the 
conservation easement program, though, are satisfaction of the conservation-
purposes tests and value of the easement. The Bureau of Land Management, 
with its specialized knowledge of the field, would seem to be much better 
equipped than the IRS to measure both. A specialized agency would also be 
better suited to assess other eligibility requirements, such as whether an 
easement’s conservation purpose is “protected in perpetuity.”
92 
Substantive agency review of applications, therefore, would likely lead to 
greater consistency in implementation and could help to curb valuation abuse. 
Also, in contrast to an open-ended tax-deduction program, a direct-spending 
program could be targeted in various ways. For example, a program that 
evaluates and ranks individual applications could give preference to easements 
with the greatest conservation value. The program could also be adapted to 
meet specific conservation goals or to allocate funds in a way that balances the 
benefit across geographic areas. A direct-spending program could also be more 
easily targeted to a specific type of land or a specific class of landowners. 
For example, prior to the 2006 amendments to the conservation easement 
deduction, much discussion arose concerning a group of “land-rich, cash-poor” 
landowners who lacked a sufficient incentive to donate under the program in 
effect at the time.
93 The 2006 amendments, which allowed an unlimited 
deduction for contributions made by “qualified” farmers and ranchers and 
substantially increased deductions for other donors, appear to have been 
designed to reach this group.
94 But a deduction will always be an inadequate 
incentive for individuals who have little or no taxable income. If conserving 
farm or ranch land is a particularly important goal, it could be accomplished in a 
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more straightforward manner through a grant program than by varying 
deduction limitations across multiple subsections of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Any government purchase of a conservation easement involves a direct 
expenditure and affects some agency’s budget. The amount spent is known and 
relevant, projects can be prioritized based on merit, and the program can be 
targeted to accomplish specific conservation goals. On the other hand, Congress 
often acts as if tax benefits are a free lunch and have no effect on the deficit. 
Moreover, tax provisions can be more easily abused.
95 Because the advantages 
of the tax-expenditure approach are minimal in the case of conservation 
easement donations, the inefficiency of this approach should be recognized and 
direct grants used instead. 
B.  Limited Tax Credits Allocated by an Expert Agency 
If the tax preference remains, Congress should impose additional conditions 
to approximate the direct-expenditure approach as nearly as possible. This 
requires some direct involvement by a public agency. 
Thus, an additional option would be to design a program that is jointly 
implemented by the IRS and an expert agency. For example, the deduction for 
conservation easement contributions could be eliminated and replaced by tax 
credits, capped at a certain dollar amount each year. These tax credits could be 
allocated by application to the Bureau of Land Management. One long-
standing example of this type of program, which has recently become far more 
common, is the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, through which state housing 
agencies distribute a fixed allotment of tax credits to developers of affordable 
housing projects.
96 
Two recent, additional examples of such tax-credit programs have 
authorized up to $250 million in tax credits for certain gasification projects
 97 and 
up to $1.25 billion in tax credits for coal facilities.
98 Both amounts are allocated 
through a joint application to the IRS and the Department of Energy.
99 The 
Department of Energy also participates in the implementation of the Qualified 
 
  95. See Stephen J. Small, Proper-and-Improper Deductions for Conservation Easements, Including 
Developer Donations, 105 TAX NOTES 217-224, Oct. 11, 2004. 
  96.  I.R.C. § 42(h). This program was created under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, § 252, 100 Stat. 2085. Annual tax expenditures for fiscal year 2010 are estimated to be $4.7 billion 
for corporations and $300 million for individuals. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH 
CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013, JCS-1-10, at 33 
(Comm. Print 2010). Under the program, state agencies have wide discretion in setting criteria by which 
they will award credits to proposed projects. 
  97.  I.R.S. Notice 2009-23, 2009-16 I.R.B. 802. Tax credits for the “qualifying gasification project 
program” under I.R.C. § 48B were authorized by section 112 of the Energy Improvement and 
Extension Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765. 
  98.  I.R.S. Notice 2009-24, 2009-16 I.R.B. 817. Tax credits for the qualifying advanced-coal-project 
program under I.R.C. § 48A were authorized by section 111 of the Energy Improvement and Extension 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765. 
  99.  Edward Kleinbard describes both of these examples in The Congress Within a Congress: How 
Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Process, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010). HALPERIN  9/15/2011  
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Advanced Energy Project Credit
100 and the Credit for Production From 
Advanced Nuclear Power Facilities.
101 This approach may be more politically 
palatable than an explicit direct-spending program and would be an 
improvement on the current regime. 
A program through which the Bureau of Land Management allocates a 
capped level of tax benefits to conservation easement donors would have many 
of the benefits listed above for direct-spending programs—including harnessing 
agency expertise, increasing consistency in implementation, and allowing for 
more-targeted distribution. A closed-ended program would also force greater 
prioritization of government funds for conservation easements. 
As in the Low Income Housing Tax Credit example, the tax benefits could 
potentially be allocated to state land-use agencies to distribute, allowing for 
diverse priorities across regions. In other programs, state agencies allocate the 
tax credits available on the issuance of certain bonds bearing tax credits.
102 A 
program could also be designed that would distribute tax credits directly to land 
trusts, which could then use the credits to “buy” conservation easements 
directly from landowners. This proposal is analogous to the New Markets Tax 
Credit, through which the Treasury allocates a capped level of tax credits to 
designated Community Development Entities (CDEs). The CDEs are then able 
to allocate these credits to investors whose funds were used to invest in low-
income communities.
103 
Such caps on tax expenditures are becoming more common, even if no 
outside agency is involved, particularly in programs for the issuance of bonds 
entitling the holder to tax credits.
104 Congress has also placed limits on the tax 
incentives for the purchase of alternative-fuel cars.
105 Thus, consistent with 
emerging practice, Congress should place a dollar limit on the conservation 
 
  100.  I.R.C. § 48C (allocated by Treasury in consultation with Department of Energy based on 
criteria described in § 48C(d)). 
  101. Id. § 45J. The Treasury allocates the annual limit after consultation with the Secretary of 
Energy under “necessary and appropriate” regulations. Id. § 45J(b)(4). 
  102.  Qualified Energy Conservation Bonds, id. § 54D (allocated by Treasury to states and large 
local governments by population, id. § 54D(e)); Qualified Zone Academy Bonds, id. § 54E (allocated 
by Treasury to states in proportion to population below poverty line, id. § 54E(c)); Qualified School 
Construction Bonds, id. § 54F (allocated by Treasury to states and large school districts in proportion to 
eligibility to receive certain grants under Elementary and Secondary Education Act, id. § 54F(d)). 
  103. Id. § 45D(f)(2). Congress capped the total level of tax credits at $5 billion for 2009. Id. § 
45D(f)(1)(F) (West 2009). 
  104.  Tax Credit to Holders of Clean Renewable Energy Bonds, id. § 54 (bond limitation allocated 
by Treasury, id. § 54(f)); New Clean Renewable Energy Bonds, id. § 54C (allocated by Treasury 
according to formula specified in Code, id. § 54C(c)(3)); Qualified Forestry Conservation Bonds, id. § 
54B (allocated by Treasury as it deems appropriate based upon applications submitted, id. § 54B(d)); 
Qualified Gulf Opportunity Zone Bond, id. § 1400N(a)(2)–(3) (maximum based on dollar amount per 
relevant population); Recovery Zone Bonds, id. §§ 1400U-2, 1400U-3 (allocated by Treasury in 
proportion to 2008 employment decline, id. § 1400U-1(a)). 
  105.  Alternative Motor Vehicle Credit, id. § 30B (phased out after first 60,000 cars, id. § 30B(f)); 
New Qualified Plug-in Electric Drive Motor Vehicles, id. § 30D (phased out after first 200,000 vehicles, 
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easement program even if it is administered through tax credits whether or not 
another agency is involved. 
C.  Certification of Public Benefit 
At the very least, a governmental agency should attest to the value of the 
conservation purpose. A long-standing example of agency involvement, which is 
now becoming more frequent, is the Department of Interior’s certification 
procedure for tax credits for the rehabilitation of historic structures. No credit is 
allowed for any expenditure attributable to the rehabilitation of a certified 
historic structure or a building in a registered historic district unless the 
Secretary of Interior certifies that rehabilitation is “consistent with the historic 
character of such property or the district in which such property is located.”
106 
Further, the Work Opportunity Credit, which provides tax credits to employers 
who hire certain classes of difficult-to-employ individuals, restricts eligibility to 
individuals certified by a designated local agency.
107 Other programs require the 
participation of another agency in implementing a tax credit.
108 Similarly, 
eligibility for a charitable deduction for a conservation easement should be 
contingent on certification—by a public agency or, possibly, an IRS-accredited 
land trust
109—that the public benefit from the contribution is equivalent to the 
claimed deduction. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the recent changes to various tax-expenditure programs—placing 
caps on the expenditures and requiring the participation of expert agencies—
indicates that Congress is less enamored than it once was with open-ended tax 
expenditures administered solely by the Treasury Department. Congress has 
recognized both the need for annual limits on expenditures and the value of 
input from an expert agency. This model should be applied to conservation 
easements. 
 
  106. Id. § 47(c)(2)(B)(iv), (C); see Historic Preservation Certification Application, NAT’L  PARK 
SERV, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.nps.gov/hps/TPS/tax/hpcappl.htm. 
  107.  I.R.C. § 51. The designated local agency would be a state employment-security agency. Id. § 
51(d)(12) 
  108. Credit for Production of Low Sulfur Diesel Fuel, id. § 45H (no credit allowed unless 
certification obtained from Treasury after consultation with Administrator of Environmental 
Protection Agency, id. § 45H(e)); Electricity Produced from Certain Renewable Resources, id. § 
45(c)(8)(B)(i) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission required to certify the amount of “incremental 
hydropower production”); Credit for Carbon Dioxide Sequestration, id. § 45Q(d)(2) (requires 
consultation with Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency and Secretaries of Energy and 
Interior with respect to regulations for determining adequate security measures for storage of carbon 
dioxide). 
  109. See  supra note 52 and accompanying text (referring to Land Trust Alliance’s accreditation 
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It cannot be claimed that the deduction for conservation easements is 
merely a part of the charitable deduction and should not be singled out for 
special treatment. Congress recognized forty years ago that charitable 
deductions for partial-interest gifts can be easily abused. It crafted narrow 
exceptions it hoped would be less troublesome. 
Furthermore, Congress recently imposed additional restrictions on 
undivided-interest gifts, which should be much less problematic than 
conservation easement donations. In the former case, the charitable interest’s 
value is clear. The only question is whether the charity, in deference to the 
donor, will fail to enforce its rights. With easements, enforcement is definitely 
more difficult and expensive, and the scope of the restrictions will often be 
murky. 
Finally, the evidence of the gift’s value is inadequate. Valuation is based on 
the supposed decline in the sales price of the donor’s holdings; this decline 
depends upon uncertain future events and the vigor of enforcement. Many 
donors have no intention of selling and would view area-wide restrictions as 
increasing the property’s value. Thus, they may have given up little of value. 
More importantly, we have no evidence that the public benefit is equal to the 
estimated decline in selling price. Because the deduction for conservation 
easements is the broadest, most unfettered exception to the partial-interest 
restriction, special treatment is justified. 
A comparison of the current tax-expenditure program’s advantages with 
those of direct grants or limited credits shows that the tax-expenditure approach 
is clearly inferior. A direct-grant program or a tax credit with an annual ceiling 
would force the easement’s recipient to prioritize and acquire only the most 
valuable easements. Of course, it would be best if an agency other than the 
Treasury selected the beneficiaries. To this end, we now have a number of 
examples of credits being allocated to local governments or private entities. 
Even if the program is open-ended, Congress should require a government 
agency—or a large, diversified land trust meeting strict minimum standards—to 
certify the conservation purpose. This certification should express agreement 
with the valuation the donor claimed for tax purposes, which should be publicly 
disclosed. The easement holder should also be required to have an established 
monitoring program and to demonstrate its ability to enforce the easement. 
This suggests more-stringent eligibility requirements. The current limitation to 
a publicly supported charity, while well intended, is inadequate. 
In short, the current system is just not acceptable. We need to find a better 
way. 
 